Historians and anthropologists are seldom seen in one another’s company. Recently, however, they have come to realize that even a desultory courtship might be to their mutual advantage. Professor Evans-Pritchard on the one side and Keith Thomas on the other have stressed how much might be gained in this way. Thus, it might perhaps be illuminating, for example, to examine Burckhardt’s historical Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy as a fine piece of cultural anthropology. The book under review, however, will (...) do little to bring these hopes near performance. It was published presumably as an act of pietas. It purports to bring together the significant pronouncements of a great anthropologist. But the effect it leaves is of a mass of vague pronouncements often couched in the most disconcerting style. The author illustrates the use of literary jargon in the process of denouncing it. This is sad. The cause is a good one but it will not be furthered by this particular collection. (shrink)

Professor J H Randall made a substantial contribution to the same debate in his Nature and Historical Experience published in 1958. In this new book he goes over much the same ground, though in a cursory way. He stresses the importance of the history of philosophy for an understanding of philosophy and singles out for attack the anti-historical outlook of contemporary English philosophy. Essentially, however, he and Gallie are on the same side. This is a disappointing book, though perhaps only (...) when it is seen against the background of Randall’s impressive contribution of the last few years. It is something of a dessert to the main feast, and rather expensive at that. (shrink)

Professor Gallie of Queen’s University, Belfast takes his history seriously, in the spirit of R G Collingwood, and like Collingwood, he gives the impression of knowing what the historian is about. He inspires confidence by reference to a wide range of historical writing, instead of the one or two faded examples which tend to turn up again and again in books on the philosophy of history. Gallie’s primary purpose may be seen as a blow against the kind of systematised history (...) which Marxism stands for. He is opposed to this and to all sociological approaches to history because they misrepresent the nature of the task which confronts the historian. For Gallie, history is essentially narrative. Narrative is indeed too weak a word. In Gallie’s view, the historian tells a story. Our attention is held because the element of the unexpected is always present as it is in a story. A rational predictable construction of a Marxist type is ruled out because of the multiplicity of contingent events round which history revolves. History for this reason is distinct from science. The historian, in Gallie’s view, is not concerned with events in so far as they are specific instances of general laws. The scientist who ignores history, however, does so at his peril. Men who assume that scientific progress is inevitable and regard history as irrelevant are disregarding the fact that scientific development has taken place in some societies but not in others. Gallie’s pages on this topic are among the most illuminating in the book. Where he is perhaps open to criticism is in pressing the analogy of history to story telling too far. It may be argued that what the historian is after is surprise. He is trying to show us that the past is not as we thought it was but different. This may be achieved in ways other than story telling. For example, the sociologist or anthropologist may teach us to look at the past in a new light. Place medieval England and twentieth century Africa in juxtaposition and handy dandy, which is the justiciar and which is the thief? This method of illuminating the past is analogous to putting two photographs together or two caricatures. Whatever it is, it cannot be described as story telling. If we regard surprise as our criterion, we may also rule out both the plodding story tellers, who bore us with banalities, and the Namierites who are equally predictable in their own sphere. In a word, we will banish the bores from history. Professor Gallie in this entertaining book may be said to have banished boredom from his own pages. He is an example to philosophers and historians alike. (shrink)

Each generation finds new significances in its own past. Historians tend to reflect in new preoccupations the interests of their own day. Hence, in an age when we are conscious of the significance of science, it is understandable that the history of science should come increasingly into prominence. Histories of science have existed since the nineteenth century—it was Comte, apparently, who coined the phrase ‘the Scientific Revolution ’—but they have been written on comparatively unsophisticated lines by scientists, turned historian in (...) the ‘sere and yellow’. To-day the position is very different. General histories of science exist in plenty and of a quality higher than any political histories of a similar kind. Journals devoted to the history of science also find a ready audience and conferences take place at regular intervals. The volume under review is the record of a conference held at Oxford in 1961 under the general heading ‘Scientific Change’, with special reference to the intellectual, social and technical conditions for scientific discovery and technical invention. (shrink)